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COMPETITION BETWEEN STATES AND PROVINCES FOR
NEW INVESTMENT: THE EFFECT OF CROSS BORDER
INCENTIVES ON PLANT LOCATION
Grahame Richards
Thank you very much, and good morning everybody. My presentation
today is going to be about Ontario's experience with investment incentives
and plant location in the past five years. I will present the case that direct
financial incentives are not cost effective, in our experience. By direct incen-
tives I mean those offered as inducements to manufacturers and service com-
panies to locate their operations in specific states or provinces or cities, not
the business climate improvements like lowering corporate tax rates, gener-
ally, that would benefit all companies.
First, I would like to place the subject of incentives in context. The com-
petition to attract investment is becoming increasingly intense. We figure we
compete with one thousand five hundred sub-national jurisdictions for in-
vestment. There was an advertisement that was placed in Fortune Magazine
by the Philippines in 1995. It proclaimed, "To attract companies like yours
we have felled mountains, razed jungles, filled swamps, moved rivers, relo-
cated towns, all to make it easier for you and your business to do business
here."1 We have not gone to such lengths in North America to the present.
But in the past decade, many governments in both the U.S. and Canada have
increased the range and value of incentives to attract business.
Advocates for publicly funded incentives argue that they are investments
rather than giveaways. The critics contend that incentives have only a mar-
ginal impact on the location decision and waste taxpayers' funds. In 1996,
the newly elected government in Ontario decided to stop offering direct in-
centives to businesses and to instead focus on improving the business climate
generally for all business. Our experience since then has convinced me and
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us that a good business case far outweighs incentives in influencing invest-
ment location decisions.
In my presentation today, I will give you some background on the types
of investment incentives and recent trends in North America, and discuss
whether direct incentives really work by examining the actual evidence. The
evidence suggests they do not, yet most investment promotion agencies, ex-
cept mine, seem to like incentives, and I will offer explanations as to why I
think they do this. I will also discuss the downside of incentives, and there
are many, and I will talk about Ontario's experience with investment incen-
tives. I noted before that we stopped offering direct incentives in 1996. The
results have been positive for us, as I will show you, and that has led us to
conclude that the future, with respect to investment incentives, is right here
in Ontario.
There are many types of incentives, some arguably more beneficial than
others. According to those who have studied the issue, no federal law in the
U.S. prevents a state from offering any incentive of any kind to anyone to
induce investment in that state. However, some constitutional lawyers, I
understand, argue that if incentives are provided in a discriminatory manner
or if they distort interstate commerce, the U.S. Supreme Court could declare
them illegal under the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section VIII of the U.S.
Constitution. Incentives have not, however, been seriously challenged in the
courts in the U.S., as we understand it.
The incentives offered by states, provinces and individual cities can be
broken down into several types. These include: tax incentives, financial in-
centives, infrastructure assistance, building roads, offering free buildings,
fast-tracking permits, subsidizing fees, subsidizing utility rates, providing
protection from environmental liability, employee training and intangible in-
kind services, such as liaison services with municipalities. These incentives
are quite widely offered.
Most states have increased almost all types of tax and financial incentives
over the last decade. This increase in aggressive competition has been called
"The new economic war between the states."' A 1996 KPMG (Klynveld
Peat Marwick Goerdeler) study found that the median amount spent by U.S.
state and a local government to lure companies to relocate was five million
2 Delos N. Lutton & Jon D. Becker, United States Investment Incentives: The New
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dollars. The incentives paid for major automobile super deals are even more
costly. Alabama paid a package worth two hundred fifty-three million dol-
lars or two hundred thousand dollars per job for a new three hundred million
dollar Mercedes assembly plant.
Over the last year or so, however, the incentives battles between states
and cities may be taming a bit as a result of good economic times. Probably
about thirty-five states indicate they are not going to increase or enhance
existing incentives. Two states, Arizona and New York, have decreased the
incentives they offer, according to a 1999 survey by the Council of State
Governments.
The number of states offering tax incentives has increased over the dec-
ade. That is also the case for all types of financial incentives; it gives you
some indication of how competitive the incentives game has been in the U.S.
both in scale and scope.
The proliferation of incentives begs the question -- do they work? The re-
ality is that empirical studies show that most tax and financial incentives do
not work. Even if they do attract some investment, they are not cost effec-
tive. There is no statistical evidence we could find that incentives are truly
effective. A review of business location studies over a twenty-year period
for the Federal Reserve Board in New England concluded that tax-based in-
centives were ineffective.
The Foreign Investment Advisory Service, (FAIS), the joint service of the
World Bank and the IFC, International Finance Corporation, has helped more
than one hundred seventeen countries attract investment. In May 1999 they
concluded, "In our experience most incentive schemes are simply not effec-
tive. They attract very little additional investment and they have costs. They
are a drain on treasuries and sometimes counter-productive because they
make investment procedures too complex.... In fact, a significant number of
multi-nationals make investment decisions in complete disregard of tax and
fiscal incentives. They take into account only what they consider to be more
basic factors. Of course, after a positive internal decision, they will bargain
as hard as possible for any incentives that are available.
3
3 Joel Bergsman, Advice on Taxation and Tax Incentives For Foreign Direct Invest-
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Most surveys of decision-makers conclude that incentives rank only
fourth or fifth among the top location decision-making criteria, after factors
such as labor skills, business costs, infrastructure and the quality of life. In
the 1999 survey of one hundred eighteen foreign-owned firms by the Univer-
sity of North Carolina, respondents ranked tax incentives eighth and govern-
ment financing tenth out of eleven location decision factors.4
In survey after survey incentives ranked low on the list of site-location
criteria. A recent Conway Data local survey of real estate development or-
ganizations ranked the availability of financial incentives fifth after labor,
operating costs, business climate and infrastructure. 5 Another recent exam-
ple is America on Line's (AOL) five hundred twenty million dollar technol-
ogy center in Virginia. AOL, apparently, accepted a much lower incentive
package, twenty-two million, than the forty million dollars it was offered by
Smyrna, Georgia. According to AOL quote, "Incentives were important, but
not a determining factor," end of quote.6 .In other words, the business case
far outweighed incentives in the final decision.
Why then do most directors of foreign investment promotion agencies
like incentives so much? Why is it that the first thing that a site location con-
sultant asks us is: what are your incentives? The FIAS has several explana-
tions.
First, government officials who believe in the effectiveness of incentives
base it on their daily experience with investors who bargain hard to get what-
ever incentives are available.
Second, incentives may be used as a signaling device. If a jurisdiction
want to change its image to one that is pro-business, investor friendly, the
announcement of a set of incentives can form a useful part of the public rela-
tions package. Whether incentives are the most cost effective way to do it is
a different question.
4Dennis A. Rondinelli & William J. Burpitt, "Do Government incentives Attract and
Retain International Investment? A study of Foreign-Owned Firms in North Carolina," Policy
Sciences (2000): in press.
5 Jack Lyne, Incentives Are Important, Executives Say, but Business Concerns Drive
the Location Process, (visited July 6, 2001)
<http://www.developmentalliance.com/docu/pdf/41150.pdf >.
6 Though Incentives Lower, Virginia Lands AOL Facility That Rejected Georgia, (vis-
ited July 6, 2001) <http://www.conway.com/ssinsider/incentive/ti9905.htm>.
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Third, the awarding of incentives provides a photo opportunity for politi-
cians. Most officials who claim incentives are effective are the ones that
grant them. They have a job to do and they naturally want all the tools they
can to get it done. Most of my staff would agree with that.
Finally, those who claim that incentives are effective often rely on cost-
benefit data prepared by consultants hired by the firm involved, and these
consultants benefit from incentives. In many cases the site-location consult-
ant's final pay will depend on the amount of incentives they extract from a
jurisdiction.
There are substantial political pressures on policy makers to allocate re-
sources to incentives, despite the evidence they do not work. The University
of North Carolina study identified several of these:
Perceptions tend to offset reality in public policy making. The publicity
suggesting that incentives attracted projects like the BMW plant to South
Carolina outweighed the reality that they were only marginal factors.
Politicians are often under pressure to, quote, "Do something now"; that
is, to create jobs and attract investment, regardless of the long-term conse-
quences. They fear criticism from the public or special interest groups for
not doing enough to entice projects to their states, especially when they're on
the short list of a site selector.
There is a "follow-the-herd" mentality in economic development policy.
Economic development officials fear they will be at a competitive disadvan-
tage if they fail to offer incentives and, although some policy makers admit
incentives may not be effective, they do not wish to be the first to disarm
economically.
There are many downsides to incentives. It is that clear that incentives do
not make a bad location a good one. However, states that cannot offer a
good business case still attempt to compensate by offering generous incen-
tives that are costly to taxpayers. That, in our opinion, takes dollars away
from infrastructure improvements and skills training. Incentives can reduce
long-term competitiveness.
Incentives provided to foreign investors also raise questions of inequity.
They are clearly unfair to local companies. Why should local companies,
who may need assistance from the state, be excluded?
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Incentives tend to be "upwardly re-distributive". They tend the use tax
revenues from small businesses and individuals to induce large companies to
make decisions they could well afford without financial assistance.
Studies have found that whatever immediate, often marginal, impact in-
centives might have, they wear off rather quickly, especially if the recipients
move on to a cheaper jurisdiction in a few years.
Let me now talk about Ontario's experience with incentives. Ontario, as
you know, has one of the most advanced and dynamic economies in the
world. Much of that dynamism is linked to international investment. About
twenty percent of the Ontario Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which stood at
two hundred forty-five billion dollars in 1998, is generated by the local op-
erations of multi-national corporations, so we welcome foreign direct in-
vestment.
In 1996, the newly elected government decided to stop offering direct
subsidies to individual businesses and to focus instead on improving the
business climate for all. The government believes that free markets work best
when they are not distorted.
For your information, Ontario municipalities are not permitted by statute
to offer tax breaks or financial incentives. Other provinces in Canada do
offer some incentives, but not as much, generally, as U.S. states. The federal
government and its agencies like the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
and provinces like Quebec have significant incentive programs. Ontario
does, therefore, face internal competition for investment in Canada. How-
ever, generally speaking, we have such a good business case to offer that we
have lost only three or four percent of projects to other provinces due to in-
centives offered in recent years.
In 1994 the provinces signed an 'Agreement on Internal Trade'. It in-
cluded a code of conduct on incentives to prevent provinces from poaching:
giving incentives to companies to relocate from one province to another.
However, there are no sanctions specified for those who violate the code.
Ontario also faces stiff competition from U.S. states. Regardless of the
competition, the Ontario government is focused on improving the business
climate and continually lowering the cost of business for all, rather than play-
ing the direct-incentives game.
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When we stopped offering incentives in 1996, we also launched an ag-
gressive program of marketing and business climate improvements. The
government's overall program included: lowering taxes, both corporate and
personal, balancing the budget, reducing debt, streamlining labor laws, in-
creasing government efficiency, reducing red tape, investing in areas such as
research and development (available to all companies), education and skills
training (offered to all), investing in healthcare and technology. As well, the
government is renewing the province's physical infrastructure through a re-
cently announced twenty billion dollar (Canadian) program called "Super-
build".
The government has cut both personal and corporate taxes substantially
and continues to do so. Ontario's corporate tax rate will be reduced to eight
percent by 2005. That will make the combined federal and provincial corpo-
rate taxes thirty point one percent in 2005, as compared to forty point five
percent combined federal and state tax in Ohio, for instance. That is not in-
cluding future tax cuts announced by President Bush.
While Ontario does not provide any direct financial assistance or subsi-
dies to investors, the package does include research and development tax
credits, skills training programs and investment marketing services.
Ontario, we believe, has a compelling business case to offer companies.
Its package includes a highly educated and available workforce, competitive
business costs, a low-cost healthcare system, good infrastructure, a pro-
business government and an excellent quality of life. Canada, as we repeat-
edly like to point out, has ranked first on the United Nations (UN) Human
Development Index for the past seven years.
Most companies use financial models to compare short listed location
sites. In these models, the net present value of Ontario-based operations
compare very favorably against those in competing U.S. states or cities.
Ontario's biggest investment goes into healthcare and education. This
translates into benefits for business: access to a skilled workforce and sub-
stantially lower health insurance costs. U.S. manufacturers pay, on average,
more than three thousand one hundred U.S. dollars per employee for the kind
of healthcare coverage provided in our publicly supported system, whereas
Ontario employers pay about five hundred and forty U.S. dollars in employer
health tax.
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A key area in which the government has invested resources is education.
Consequently, Ontario boasts a highly educated workforce. Ontario's system
of seventeen universities and twenty-five colleges is one of the most highly
developed anywhere. In the Toronto area, the Toronto University complex,
for example, is second to only to Boston in engineering and science gradu-
ates.
Consulting firms such as Price Waterhouse Coopers and Arthur Anderson
have been engaged by us to develop net-present-value models for us in our
selling efforts for both call centers and auto parts manufacturers. These
compare operating costs between Ontario and competing U.S. locations.
Ontario locations invariably turn out to have lower operating costs under
various scenarios, such as Windsor, Ontario on this slide. These models have
been far more persuasive to investment decision-makers than any incentive
we might have offered. These models do not run on just sixty-five cent dol-
lars (one Canadian dollar equal to sixty five U.S. cents). We run them on
whatever factor the investors want to plug in, generally up to seventy-five
and eighty cent dollars.
Ontario's approach, we think, has not hurt our investment attraction ef-
forts to date. The success of Ontario's approach is evident from the results --
we have had a booming economy, and eight hundred twenty-three thousand
net new jobs since September of 1995. We have strong growth in capital
investments and exports; and, accelerating cross-border U.S. investment in
the call center, information technology and automotive industries, just to
name a few. By every economic measure; Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth, jobs, exports, investment, the decision to focus on improving the
business climate, rather than incentives, appears to have been the right one.
Over the past four years, for example, Ontario has created more manufactur-
ing jobs than any U.S. state or Canadian province.
The economy has grown by well over four percent in each of the last four
years, a marked contrast from the one percent average growth from 1990 to
1995, when Ontario did offer a wide range of incentives.
So what have we learned from the various studies and our own experi-
ence?
The evidence suggests to us that most incentives do not work; even if
some do, they are rarely, if ever, cost effective, and they are not sustainable
in the long term. Most objective observers of the incentives game have real-
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ized that large sums of money spent have led to a prisoners-dilemma-type
situation, where every state or city would be better off if they all reduced
their incentives. This is best achieved through multi-lateral policy coordina-
tion under the auspices of, say, the World Trade Organization (WTO) or
some other organization. In the U.S. there have been calls to legislate an end
to the "Economic War Between the States", but no significant action has
been taken. Ontario has taken bold steps with a different approach, and our
experience continues to demonstrate that a good business case far outweighs
the benefits of incentives.
Thank you very much for your attention.
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